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Abstract 
We analyze the evolution of Sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural total factor productivity 
(TFP) over the past 45 years, looking for evidence of recent changes in growth patterns 
using an improved nonparametric Malmquist index. Our TFP estimates show a 
remarkable recovery in the performance of Sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture between 
1984 and 2006 after a long period of poor performance and decline. That recovery is the 
consequence of improved efficiency in production resulting from changes in the output 
structure and an adjustment in the use of inputs. Policy interventions, including fiscal, 
trade and sector specific policies, appear to have played an important role in improving 
agriculture’s performance. Despite the improved agricultural performance, SSA 
economies face serious challenges to sustain growth. Among these are the small 
contribution of technical change to TFP growth in the past, the large tax burden imposed 
by remaining distortions, and the challenge of population growth.  
 
Key words: agriculture, efficiency, Malmquist index, total factor productivity, technical 
change, Sub-Saharan Africa, policy 
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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the most important development challenge of the 
21st century. This region has been lagging behind the rest of the developing world in 
terms of economic growth and poverty alleviation, widening the gap between SSA and 
emerging developing countries. GDP per capita was only $612 (constant 2000 value) in 
2009, which is only less than one-third of the level in developing East Asia. As a result, 
29 out of the 40 low income countries are in this sub-continent, and countries with the 
highest rates of malnutrition can be found in SSA. 
Economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have exhibited impressive performance 
in recent years, growing at 6 percent per year. This brings widespread optimism among 
researchers and policy makers, fueled by the end of several civil wars, a wave of 
democratization in several countries (which made possible the creation of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD, and a new agenda for development), 
the acceleration of economic growth, and significant improvements in the performance 
of the agricultural sector across Africa during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Agricultural sector is predominant in most SSA economies, contributing more 
than one-third of the regional GNP and employing more than two-thirds of the labor 
force (World Bank, 2010). Agriculture is also one of the major sources of foreign 
exchange earnings. In spite of its central role in the region’s economy, agricultural 
performance has not been as encouraging as in other developing countries, represented 
by the low cereal yield and high reliance on grain imports. On the other hand, low 
inherent soil fertility together with increased population pressure has caused soil 
degradation and nutrient depletion across much of the continent. 
In the long run, sustainable agricultural growth can only be achieved through 
increased total factor productivity (TFP), the amount of output per unit of total factors 
used in the production process (Winters et al. 1998). A more efficient use of resources 
becomes increasingly important as countries begin to face resource constraints. Despite   2 
evidence of improved performance in the past 10 years, there are only a few studies that 
have attempted to analyze SSA’s agricultural productivity changes and the factors 
explaining those changes. Most studies have shown evidence of recovery in Africa. 
However, estimates of the magnitude of productivity growth vary depending on the 
analytical methodology and sample. 
Block (1995) finds agricultural productivity growth rates during the 1970s is 
disappointing, but 39 SSA countries grew at approximately 1.6 percent per year from 
1983 to 1988. Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) suggest that average growth in productivity for 
47 African countries is 1.27 percent per year in 1961–1991. No signs of sustained 
growth in productivity are found during the 1960s and 1970s and productivity growth 
picks up after 1984, Fulginiti et al. (2004) report total gains of 0.83 percent for 41 SSA 
countries between 1960 and 1999. However, between 1985 and 1999 productivity rose 
by 1.9 percent per year. They also found evidence of fairly strong growth during the 
1980s and 1990s, with annual growth rates of 1.29 and 1.62 percent, respectively.  
In contrast, Trueblood and Coggins (2003) claim that although selected countries 
show signs of recovery in the 1980s, the SSA regional aggregate productivity has 
declined by an average of 0.9 percent. They attribute those losses to, among other things, 
the choice of the technology frontier, which is defined by the most efficient countries in 
the sample. Instead of using SSA countries as reference like Fulginiti et al. (2004), 
Trueblood and Coggins use a global average. Similarly, based on a global sample, Coelli 
and Prasada Rao (2005) report that 6 out of 18 African countries have productivity 
growth rate above 2 percent during the 1980–2000 period. 
Recently, Evenson and Avila (2007) estimate the average TFP growth for Africa 
(including North Africa) at 1.68 percent per year in 1981-2001, higher than what they 
find for the 1961–1980 period (1.20 percent). Following the same fixed input cost 
shares, a slightly lower productivity growth rate of 1.2 percent is reported by Fuglie 
(2008) for SSA since 1990. Alene (2010) finds that SSA agricultural productivity grew 
at 1.6 percent per year1970–2004, based on a sequential technology frontier approach. In 
a recent paper Block (2010) revisits agricultural productivity growth in SSA and finds 
that total factor productivity growth has increased rapidly since the early 1980s 
following a period of nearly 20 years of declining rates of TFP. Block associates this   3 
improved performance with expenditures on agricultural R&D, along with the reform of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies that enhanced agricultural incentives  
In addition, researchers have examined whether the source of growth is technical 
change or purely gains in efficiency. Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) argue that the majority of 
countries with higher labor-to-land ratios experience higher gains in technical progress 
while most countries with lower labor/land ratios experience more improvement in 
efficiency scores. Nin-Pratt and Yu (2008) indicate that productivity recovery is the 
consequence of improved efficiency in production, resulting from changes in the output 
structure and an adjustment in the use of inputs, including an overall net reduction in 
fertilizer use but increased fertilizer use in most of the best-performing countries. In 
contrast, Alene (2010) finds that technical progress, rather than efficiency change, is the 
principal source of productivity growth in SSA.  
Empirical evidence on factors explaining the recovery of African agricultural 
productivity is sparse, with most studies looking at the relationship between productivity 
and policy reforms. Block (1995) finds that almost two-thirds of TFP growth can be 
explained by macroeconomic policy changes. Similarly, Nin-Pratt and Yu (2008) find 
that policy changes implemented in the mid-1980s and the second half of the 1990s, 
combined with technological innovations available at that time, appear to have played an 
important role in improving agriculture’s performance. 
Investment in agricultural R&D also made a significant contribution to 
productivity growth according to both Block (1995) and Lusigi and Thirtle (1997). This 
is confirmed by Alene (2010), who finds that agricultural R&D and improved weather 
together with policy reforms, contributed to the recovery of agricultural productivity. 
Other factors associated with productivity growth include institution (Fulginiti et al., 
2004) and population pressure (Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997).  
Generally speaking, negative productivity growth rates are observed during the 
1960s and 1970s. Agricultural productivity rises since the mid-1980s, with growth rates 
in total factor productivity (TFP) ranging between 0.5 and 2 percent per year, a clear 
improvement from growth rates observed in the earlier years. Possible factors that 
explains TFP growth includes policy and agricultural R&D.    4 
This study focuses on the analysis of policy changes and investments behind the 
recovery of SSA’s agricultural sector answering the following questions: Which policy 
changes were behind SSA’s agriculture recovery? Which policies and investment are 
needed to sustain agricultural TFP growth in the coming years? We examine the impact 
of macro and sectoral policies on agricultural productivity growth, and also the role of 
trade policies in SSA’s export diversification and insertion in world markets. First we 
estimate a nonparametric Malmquist index and its components (efficiency and technical 
change). Instead of fixed input cost share used by other researchers, we constrain the 
shadow input shares in the estimation of distance functions to rule out the possibility of 
zero input shadow prices. Next, we update the study by Nin-Pratt and Yu (2008) by 
using a group of policy indicators to determine the contribution of policies to the 
improved performance of SSA’s agricultural sector. 
We make several contributions to the literature of agricultural productivity in 
SSA. First, this paper expands the existing literature by bringing new evidence to 
investigate the factors behind the dynamism of agriculture and the possible linkage 
between agricultural growth and policy changes. Second, we confirm the improved 
performance of SSA’s agriculture since the mid-1980s measured in terms of TFP 
growth. Third, we are able to quantify the impact of various policies on productivity, 
suggesting that more favorable policy environment contribute to the recent recovery in 
agriculture.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the methodology 
employed and the data used to estimate agricultural TFP. Section 3 presents productivity 
estimates and discussion of results, while main findings from the literature on SSA’s 
policies in past decades are presented in section 4. This is followed by results of the 
estimation of an econometric model relating agricultural TFP series with measures of 
policies in section 5. The last section summarizes main findings and concludes.  
 
2. Productivity Measures and Methodology 
  Productivity change is defined as the ratio of change in output to change in input. 
In the hypothetical case of a production unit using one input to produce one output, the 
measure of productivity is fairly simple to derive. However, production units can use   5 
multiple inputs to produce one or more outputs, and under such circumstances the 
primary challenge in measuring TFP rises from the need to aggregate different inputs 
and outputs. The aggregation of inputs and outputs is both conceptually and empirically 
difficult. Several methods to aggregate inputs and outputs are available, resulting in 
different approaches to measuring TFP. Such methods can be classified into four major 
groups: (a) econometric production models; (b) total factor productivity indices; (c) data 
envelope analysis (DEA); and (d) stochastic frontiers.  
The Malmquist index, pioneered by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and 
based on distance functions, has been extensively used in the measure and analysis of 
productivity after Färe et al. (1994) showed that the index can be estimated using DEA, a 
nonparametric approach. The nonparametric Malmquist index has been especially 
popular because it is easy to compute and does not require information about input or 
output prices or assumptions regarding economic behavior, such as cost minimization 
and revenue maximization. This is especially attractive in the context of African 
agriculture, where input market prices are either nonexistent or insufficiently reported to 
provide any meaningful information for land, labor, and livestock. Malmquist index 
approach is chosen for its ability to decompose productivity growth into two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive components: changes in technical efficiency over time 
(catching up) and shifts in technology over time (technical change).  
 
The Malmquist TFP Index 
The Malmquist index measures the TFP change between two data points (e.g., 
those of a country in two different time periods) by calculating the ratio of the distance 
of each data point relative to a common technological frontier. Following Färe et al. 
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This index is estimated as the geometric mean of two Malmquist indices, one using as a 
reference the technology frontier in t ( ) t M , and a second index that uses the frontier in   6 
t + 1 as the reference ( ) 1 + t M . The distance function  ) , ( t t t y x D  measures the distance of 
a vector of inputs (x) and outputs (y) in period t to the technological frontier in the same 
period t. On the other hand,  ) , ( 1 t t t y x D +
 measures the distance between the same vector 
of inputs and outputs in period t, but in this case to the frontier in period t + 1. The other 
two distances can be explained in the same fashion.  
Färe et al. (1994) showed that the Malmquist index could be decomposed into an 
efficiency change component and a technical change component, and that these results 
applied to the different period-based Malmquist indices. It follows that 
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The ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in technical efficiency from 
period t to t + 1, or how far the observed production is from maximum potential 
production. The expression inside the brackets measures technical change, capturing the 
shift of technology frontier between the two periods. If the efficiency change index 
values greater than one, it means that the production unit is closer to the frontier in 
period t + 1 than it was in period t, in other word, the production unit is catching up to 
the frontier. A value less than one indicates efficiency regress. The same holds for the 
technical change component of total productivity growth, signifying technical progress 
when the value is greater than one and technical regress when the index is less than one. 
However, as in Nin et al. (2003), the DEA approach used to estimate distances defines 
the frontier as a sequential frontier, ruling out the possibility of technical regress. The 
method has been extensively applied to the international comparison of agricultural 
productivity.  
To define the input-based Malmquist index, it is necessary to define and estimate 
the distance functions D, which requires a characterization of the production technology 
and production efficiency. Following Kuosmanen et al. (2004), we formally defining 
technology and efficiency and relating this measure with allocative efficiency and an 
economic measure of performance. This approach allows us to highlight the importance   7 
of shadow prices in the nonparametric estimation of distance functions and to be able to 
introduce new information in the estimation of distance functions to avoid the bias 
caused by zero shadow prices. 
 
Technology and Distance Functions 
We assume, as in Färe et al. (1994), that for each time period t = 1,…., T the 
production technology describes the possibilities for the transformation of inputs x
t into 
outputs y
t, or the set of output vectors y that can be produced with input vector x. The 
technology in period t with 
m t R y + ∈  outputs and 
n t R x + ∈  inputs is characterized by the 




t): such that x
t can produce y
t }.     (3) 
The technology described by the production possibility set L
t satisfies the usual set of 
axioms: closedness, nonemptiness, scarcity, and no free lunch. The frontier of the 
production possibility set for a given output vector is defined as the input vector that 
cannot be decreased by a uniform factor without leaving the set.  
The nonparametric distance functions can be defined in either the envelope form 
and a dual equivalent approach that can be derived from the envelope or primal form 
(see Kuosmanen et al. 2004). The envelope approach is normally the one preferred in the 
literature to estimate distances. On the other hand, the dual form has the advantage of a 
more intuitive specification, offering an economic interpretation of the problem. It also 
allows an explicit estimation of input and output shadow prices and the possibility of 
imposing bounds to those prices. Hence we focus here on the dual form for this study. 
The dual linear program measures efficiency as the ratio of a normalized 
weighted sum of all outputs. The weights are obtained by solving the following problem 
(Coelli and Prasada Rao 2001):    8 
n 1,..., j   m; 1,..., k                              0 ,
r 1,..., i          0
1
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where the optimal weights k ρ  and  j ω  are respectively output k and input j shadow 
prices.  
Kuosmanen et al. (2004) generalize the dual interpretation of the distance 
function to the case of closed, nonempty production sets satisfying scarcity and no free 
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They interpret this distance function as “the return to the dollar,
1
 
 at the ‘most 
favorable’ prices, subject to a normalizing condition that no feasible input-output vector 
yields a return to the dollar higher than unity at those prices.” There exists a vector of 
shadow prices for any arbitrary input-output vector; however, these prices need not be 
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and contend in the spirit of the theory of revealed preferences (Varian 1984) that “the 
observed allocation of inputs and outputs can indirectly reveal the economic prices 
underlying the production decision.” Based on this, they assume that decision-making 
units allocate inputs and outputs to maximize return to the dollar. Such prices are well 
                                                 
1 Return to the dollar is an economic criterion to evaluate performance. It measures the ability of 
producers to attain maximum revenue to cost (introduced by Georgescu-Roegen 1951 and referred to in 
Kuosmanen et al. 2004). The assumption of allocative efficiency depends on the specified economic 
objectives of the firms through the shadow price domain (Kuosmanen et al. 2004).   9 
defined and are observed by decision makers but are not known by the productivity 
analyst. Assuming that decision-making units allocate inputs and outputs to maximize 
return to the dollar, Kuosmanen et al. (2004) define that the production vector (y
t,x
t) is 
allocatively efficient with respect to technology L
t and prices (
t t ω ρ , ) if and only if (
t t ω ρ , )∈V
t(y
t,x
t). Allocative efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
maximization of return to the dollar given that it allows for technical inefficiency 
(production in the interior of the PPS). This dual approach to the problem of efficiency 
and input allocation will be used below to analyze the plausibility of shadow prices 
obtained when estimating efficiency and eventually to correct those prices, introducing 
exogenous information into the linear programming problem.  
 
Introducing Bounds to Shadow Input Shares 
The lack of prior price information for inputs was pointed out as the prime 
motivation for estimating nonparametric Malmquist indices for the analysis of TFP 
change in SSA. If we do not constrain the linear programming problem used in DEA to 
determine efficiency, we allow total flexibility in choosing shadow prices. Because of 
the lack of price information already mentioned, in most of the literature on efficiency 
and nonparametric TFP analysis, flexibility has been considered to be one of the major 
advantages of DEA when comparing it with other techniques used to measure efficiency 
or productivity (Pedraja-Chaparro et al. 1997). However, total flexibility for the weights 
has been criticized on several grounds, given that the weights estimated by DEA can 
prove to be inconsistent with prior knowledge or accepted views on relative prices or 
cost shares.  
Pedraja-Chaparro et al. (1997) stress two main problems with respect to allowing 
total shadow price flexibility. First, by allowing total flexibility in choosing shadow 
prices, inputs considered important a priori could be all but ignored in the analysis or 
could end up being dominated by inputs of secondary importance. Such is the case when 
linear programming problems assign a zero or close to zero price to some factors 
because of the particular shape of the production possibility set. Second, the relative 
importance attached to the different inputs and outputs by each unit should differ greatly. 
Although some degree of flexibility on the weights may be desirable to reflect each   10 
decision-making unit’s particular circumstances, it may often be unacceptable to have 
weights varying substantially from one decision-making unit to another. Another 
argument used against total flexibility of shadow prices (Kuosmanen et al. 2006) is that 
in some cases, a certain amount of information regarding the input and output prices or 
shares might be available. In that case, the analysis can be strengthened by imposing 
price information in the form of additional constraints that define a feasible range for the 
relative prices. Therefore, a strong case seems to exist for the analysis of shadow prices 
obtained from DEA when estimating efficiency and TFP, and eventually for considering 
the introduction of restrictions on shadow prices or cost shares, setting limits between 
which prices or shares can vary.  
To define suitable limits to the value that input shares take, we set an upper and a 
lower bound (ai,bi) to the input share in problem (4). We define the standard distance 




i x × ω  (the input shadow prices multiplied by the input quantities) is equal to the 
implicit input shares as shown in Coelli and Prasada Rao (2001): 
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Note that the introduction of bounds on shadow input shares constitutes additional 
constraints to the original formulation. Restricted and unrestricted models will provide 
the same results only if all the additional restrictions imposed are nonbinding. In general, 
the narrower the imposed bounds, the larger the expected differences between model 
results.  
To define the bounds for the input shares, we introduce information on the likely 
value of the shares of the different inputs from Evenson and Dias Avila (2007). In that   11 
paper, the authors estimate crop input cost shares for 32 SSA countries by adjusting 
carefully measured share calculations for India.  Cost shares of SSA countries were 
calculated by scaling India’s input shares comparing India’s input/cropland ratio to those 
ratios of the particular SSA country. Given that inputs used in the study by Evenson and 
Dias Avila (2007) are similar to those used here, we use information from that study to 
determine the maximum and minimum share values for each input among all countries 
and use those estimated shares as a rough reference to set the limits between which input 
shares in DEA estimates for SSA countries can vary. By setting these general limits for 
all countries, we allow input shares to vary, keeping flexibility and uncertainty about the 
true value of such shares and contemplating differences in the unique circumstance of 
each individual country. With the imposition of share bounds, the linear programming 
program can no longer disregard the less favorable inputs, and we ensure that the most 
important outputs and inputs are attached higher weights than the ones considered less 
important. A more thorough discussion of the bounds imposed and a comparison of the 
results of the constrained and unconstrained problems used in the estimation of distance 
functions can be found in Nin-Pratt and Yu (2010). 
 
Data and Countries Included in This Study 
To estimate TFP growth in SSA, the only internationally comparable database 
available to us is that of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO). It provides national time-series data from 1961 to 2006 for the total quantity of 
different agricultural inputs and output volumes measured in international dollars. We 
use one output (agricultural production) and five inputs (labor, land, fertilizer, tractors, 
and animal stock) for 98 countries, including 26 SSA countries, to estimate TFP.
2
                                                 
2 We combine a dissimilarity index developed by Fox et al. (2004) and a modification to the DEA model 
suggested by Andersen and Petersen (1993) to identify outliers. The dissimilarity index provides bilateral 
comparisons of the input-output vector of all countries with a reference input-output vector defined as the 
mean of all countries, showing how different each country is from the mean. The method by Andersen and 
Petersen measures the influence that some observations have on efficiency estimates of other observations. 
 
Agricultural output is expressed as the quantity of agricultural production measured in 
millions of 1999–2001 “international dollars.” Agricultural land is measured as the 
number of hectares of arable and permanent cropland; labor is measured as the total 
economically active agricultural population; fertilizer is the metric tons of nitrogen,   12 
potash, and phosphates used measured in nutrient-equivalent terms; livestock is the total 
number of animals (cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs, and laying hens) measured in cow 
equivalents.  
Output growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1964 to 1983 was on average 
1.80 percent, with the worst performance occurring between 1972 and 1983 below the 
rate of increase in the use of inputs in agriculture (1.2 percent). The recovery of SSA’s 
agriculture resulted in output growth rates of 3.2 percent per annum between 1984 and 
2003, slightly surpass the population growth rate of 2.6 percent over the same period. 
However, despite the recent recovery, output per capita in 2003 was only close to its 
level in the 1960s. 
 
3. Agricultural TFP growth, 1961–2006 
The overall performance of agriculture in SSA was poor between 1961 and 2006. 
A simple average of TFP measures at the country level for a sample of 26 SSA countries 
shows that annual growth in that period was almost zero (0.02 percent). This average, 
however, hides significant variations across time, where two periods with contrasting 
results can be distinguished (Figure 1 and Table 1). The first period is characterized by 
poor performance and negative productivity growth (-1.33 percent per annum) stretches 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Recovery starts in 1984–1985 and extends to 
2006, with agricultural TFP growing at 1.37 percent per year. What more important, the 
growth has been accelerating: annual growth rate is 1.25 percent in 1984–1995 and this 
rate is boosted to 1.43 percent in 1996-2006. 
The decomposition of SSA’s TFP growth into efficiency and technical change 
shows that most TFP growth of the last 20 years is the result of SSA catching up to the 
frontier after falling behind during the 1970–1983 period (Table 1). It is clear from the 
table that between 1984 and 2006 the region was only catching up with efficiency levels 
of the early 1960s.  
  The TFP performance of individual countries varies depending on the period 
considered. Between 1984 and1993, two countries explain most of agricultural TFP 
growth: Nigeria and Ghana, contributing 61 and 17 percent, respectively, to total TFP 
growth in the region. Other countries with a relatively significant contribution to TFP   13 
growth during that period are Sudan and Tanzania (Figure 2a). Those four countries 
together explain 94 percent of total TFP growth in our sample over the period of 1984-
1993. The number of countries contributing to total TFP growth increases significantly 
between 1994 and 2006, with nine countries explaining 90 percent of TFP growth during 
that period. In addition to the four major contributors in 1984-1993, Ethiopia, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Kenya, and Cameroon also fuel the acceleration of TFP growth in 1994-
2006 (Figure 2b). 
Looking at agricultural TFP growth rates for individual countries between 1984 
and 2006, we observe that TFP grew above 1.5 percent per annum in 10 of the 26 
countries in our sample (Table 2). Angola leads the group in terms of productivity 
performance, growing at 4 percent annually (average index of 1.04). Nigeria and Ghana 
also rank high in the sample, with growth rate reach 3.4 and 3.0 percent, respectively. 
Tanzania and Sierra Leone also show remarkable growth and average TFP growth rates 
top 2 percent.  
This ranking changes if we focus on most recent years between 1995 and 2006. 
As shown in the last six columns of Table 2, Angola is still the country with the fastest 
growing agricultural TFP, but Mozambique, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso rises with 
impressive growth in agricultural sector. Nigeria and Ghana are still among the best SSA 
performers, although the average TFP growth slows slightly in 1995-2006 period. Mali, 
Zambia, Madagascar and Ethiopia also improved their performance significantly.  
Decomposition of TFP growth into its components in Table 2 shows that in 
general, most of TFP growth is explained by efficiency gains, which corresponds to the 
fact that most countries are recovering from periods of negative productivity growth and 
reduction in efficiency. For instance, fast TFP growth in Angola is the result of catching-
up after an extended period of civil war, which is reflected in zero growth rate of 
technical change (index=1). Likewise, TFP growth in Nigeria and Ghana is also mainly 
explained by efficiency growth instead of technology advances. In the case of other 
countries in Coastal West Africa, only Benin shows significant contribution of technical 
change to TFP growth. A similar result is obtained in East Africa. In Southern Africa, 
the contribution of technical change to TFP appears to be important in the case of   14 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, but performance of agriculture in these countries was 
generally poor due to growing inefficiency.  
  To better understand TFP, partial productivity measures, namely labor and land 
productivity, are examined. These two indicators capture changes in the labor/land ratio, 
which is affected by increased rural population (or agricultural labor force) and the 
incorporation of arable land to crop production. Rural living standard will deteriorate if 
rural population grows faster than yields (Block 1995). Table 3 lists the 9 top performers 
of TFP growth in SSA during the period of improved performance in 1995-2006. These 
countries show on average high TFP growth, slow or negative growth of workers per 
hectare (with the exception of Angola), and increased labor and land productivity. They 
are more likely to have increased rural living standards through increased labor income 
in agriculture. A caveat to these results is that in many of these countries labor per 
hectare increased slowly because they were still able to incorporate more land into crop 
production, given that the rural population is still showing significant growth. If the 
availability of land decreases in the coming years, yields will need to increase faster to 
compensate for growth in rural population and improve rural income. 
 
4. Policy changes and growth in agriculture 
According to Anderson and Masters (2008), most African countries gain 
independence in the 1960s at a time when central planning was widely seen as a 
promising strategy for economic development. In this environment, elected governments 
across Africa typically kept the marketing boards and other instruments for intervention 
that had been developed by previous administrations, expanding their mandate and 
increasing public employment, in many cases as a mean for electoral politics. In the 
1970s, growing fiscal deficits, current account imbalances and overvalued exchange 
rates were supported by project aid and loans at a time of zero or negative real interest 
rates as governments chose to ration credit and foreign exchange rather than expand the 
money supply. The result of growing government intervention was political instability 
and weak market institutions.  
  African governments faced mounting pressures for public-sector reform with the 
rise in world real interest rates, combined with global recession that worsened Africa’s   15 
terms of trade during the 1980s. These changes made it increasingly difficult for 
governments to finance the growing fiscal deficits associated with intervention. The 
World Bank, IMF, and USAID as lenders of last resort, made their aid conditional on 
devaluation, deregulation, privatization and retrenchment. As a result, trade policy 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were heavily influenced by structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF. Loan conditions were 
often blamed for the economic stresses which accompanied them, but the actual 
implementation of reforms was typically slow and often subject to reversal or offsetting 
policy changes (Anderson and Masters 2008).  
  As Anderson and Masters conclude, Africa’s larger countries have had relatively 
interventionist governments followed by reform and a degree of recovery. Although the 
differences in the process of policy reform followed by these countries are frequently 
emphasized, there are also clear patterns across countries and clear trends in policy 
choices. 
  In order to “assess how much policy reform has taken place in Africa, how 
successful it has been, and how much more remained to be done”, World Bank (1994) 
concludes that progress has been made, but reforms remain incomplete. It also stresses 
that poor macroeconomic and sectoral policies were the main factors behind the poor 
performance of SSA’s economy between the mid-1960s and the 1980s. These poor-
designed policies resulted in overvalued exchange rates, prolonged budget deficits, 
protectionist trade policies and government monopolies, which reduced competition, 
affected productivity negatively and imposed heavy taxation on agricultural exports. 
Food markets were controlled by state enterprises, which also monopolized the import 
and distribution of fertilizers and other inputs, which were often supplied to farmers at 
subsidized prices and on credit. The prices farmers received were generally low because 
of taxation or high costs incurred by state enterprises. The negative impact of such 
policies on agricultural prices was particularly significant in the case of export crops. 
During this period, African governments followed a development strategy that 
prioritized industrialization, with a clear bias against agriculture (Kherallah et al. 2000).  
As emphasized by Kherallah et al. (2000), one of the most fundamental shifts in 
the development strategy for Africa was to view agriculture not as a backward sector but   16 
as the engine of growth, an important source of export revenues and the primary means 
to reduce poverty. The idea behind the structural adjustment programs was that reducing 
or eliminating state control over marketing would promote private-sector activity and 
that fostering competitive markets would lead to increased agricultural production.
3
Policy reforms have been uneven across sectors and/or across countries and 
occurred in two major waves. The first wave of reforms started in 1984–1985. Almost 
two-thirds of African countries managed to put better macroeconomic and agricultural 
policies in place by the end of the 1980s. Improvements in the macroeconomic 
framework also enabled countries to adopt more market-based systems of foreign 
exchange allocation and fewer administrative controls over imports (World Bank, 1994). 
The second wave of reforms came when many countries made major gains in 
macroeconomic stabilization, particularly since 1994. The devaluation of the CFA franc 
significantly improved the performance of the economy and of the agricultural sector in 
several West African countries. According to the World Bank (2000), by the end of the 
1990s, the combination of sustained reforms and financial assistance was associated with 
better economic performance, at least at the aggregate level. Most prices have been 
decontrolled and marketing boards eliminated (except in some countries for key exports 
such as cotton and cocoa). Current account convertibility has been achieved; trade taxes 
have been rationalized from high average levels of 30 to 40 percent to trade-weighted 
average tariffs of 15 percent or less. Trade-weighted tariffs are now below 10 percent in 
more open countries such as Uganda and Zambia. Arbitrary exemptions, although still 
numerous, have also been rationalized.  
  
In the case of agriculture reform, most policy changes took place after 1986–
1987, and significant progress was achieved. Most countries lowered export taxes, raised 
administered producer prices, reduced marketing costs (usually by deregulation and de-
monopolization of export marketing), and depreciated the exchange rate of the domestic 
                                                 
3 The reforms included four types of measures as summarized by Kherallah et al. (2000): (a) 
liberalizing input and output prices by eliminating subsidies on agricultural inputs and bringing domestic 
crop prices in line with world prices; (b) reducing overvalued exchange rates; (c) encouraging private-
sector activity by removing regulatory controls in input and output markets; and (d) restructuring public 
enterprises and restricting marketing boards to activities such as providing market information.   17 
currency (Cleaver and Donovan 1995). According to the World Bank (2008), the 
average net taxation of agriculture in SSA was more than halved between 1980–1984 
and 2000–2004. During the same period, agriculture-based countries (mostly African 
countries) lowered protection of agricultural importables, from a 14 percent tariff 
equivalent to 10 percent, and reduced taxation of exportables, from 45 percent to 19 
percent. Most of the decline in taxation is the result of improved macroeconomic 
policies (World Bank 2008).  
As a result of these changes in the first years of the reform, two-thirds of the 
adjusting countries were taxing their farmers less, and policy changes increased real 
producer prices for agricultural exporters. Most of the governments that had major 
restrictions on the private purchase, distribution, and sale of major food crops before 
adjustment have withdrawn from marketing almost completely. On the other hand, 
governments sold only a small share of their assets, although governments have stopped 
expanding their public enterprise sectors (World Bank 1994). 
Market reforms were more comprehensive in food markets than in export crop or 
input markets. Kherallah et al. (2000) explain progress in food market reforms by the 
losses that those markets brought to governments, whereas in contrast, the purchase and 
sale of export commodities brought considerable revenue to many governments. Also, 
major restrictions on the purchase and sale of agricultural commodities were eliminated: 
Benin (tubers); Ethiopia (teff, maize, wheat); Mali (millet, sorghum); Tanzania (maize); 
Malawi and Zambia partially (maize) (Kherallah 2000).  
  Anderson and Masters (2008) estimate nominal and relative rates of assistance 
(NRA and RRA respectively) to measure the effect of government policies on returns to 
farmers in SSA.
4
                                                 
4 NRA is defined as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers 
above what they would be without the government’s intervention and are based on estimates of assistance 
to individual industries at the farm gate. As farmers are affected not only by the prices of their own 
outputs, but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face affecting mobile resources engaged in 
other sectors, Anderson and Masters (2008) also estimate NRAs for the nonfarm sector to capture the 
effect that policies had on agriculture through their effect on nonfarm activities. RRAs are then calculated 
as the ratio of farm and nonfarm NRAs. See Anderson and Masters for details on these estimates. 
 We highlight here some of their main conclusions from the analysis of 
changes in rates of assistance to agriculture:  
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•  At present, African governments have removed much of their earlier anti-farm 
and anti-trade policy biases, and most of these changes have come from reduced 
taxation of farm exports.  
•  Substantial distortions remain and still impose a large tax burden on Africa’s 
poor. In constant 2000 US dollar terms, the transfers paid by farmers were 
reduced to an average of $41 per person working in agriculture from a peak value 
of $134 in the late 1970s. However, this lower amount is still appreciably larger 
than in other regions, given that in both Asia and Latin America, the average 
agricultural NRAs and RRAs reached zero by the early 2000s. 
•  Trade restrictions continue to be Africa’s most important instruments of 
agricultural intervention. Domestic taxes and subsidies on farm inputs and 
outputs, and non-product specific assistance, are a small share of total distortions 
to farmer incentives in Africa. As a result, policy incidence on consumers tends 
to mirror the incidence on producers, with fiscal expenditures playing a much 
smaller role than in more-affluent regions. 
 
5. Linking Policy Reforms with TFP Growth in Agriculture 
Since the implementation of structural adjustment programs, policymakers and 
academics have argued about the causes of and the solutions to the African crisis and the 
impact of the structural adjustment promoted by the international financial institutions in 
the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Arndt et al. 2000; Boratav 2001; Mkandawire 
2005). As discussed above, agricultural productivity in SSA was affected by distortions 
to agricultural incentives through macroeconomic, sectoral policy and trade measures. 
Importantly, the total effect of distortions on the agricultural sector depends not only on 
direct agricultural policy measures, but also on policy measures altering incentives in 
non-agricultural sectors. It is therefore important to link a comprehensive package of 
government assistance with producers’ performance. 
We use some broad indicators to capture policies that could potentially affect 
agricultural productivity. We group these indicators in four major groups. The first set of 
indicators captures macroeconomic policy: money supply, inflation, real exchange rate 
and valuation of local currency. Following Rodrik (2008), the real exchange rate is   19 
defined as exchange rate measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to allow 
cross country comparison. When real exchange rate is greater than one, the value of the 
local currency is lower (or more depreciated) than it is in PPP terms. The real exchange 
rate is corrected to take into account the Balassa-Samuelson effect: as poor countries 
grow, the labor productivity of their traded-goods sector will rise, spilling over to wages 
and prices in producing non-traded goods, and so their price structures should become 
more like those of developed countries. We obtain the index of undervaluation as the 
difference between actual and adjusted real exchange rate. If the undervaluation index is 
above one, the local currency is undervalued.  
The second set of indicators is used to describe support to the agricultural sector, 
and includes nominal protection coefficients (NPC) and nominal rates of assistance 
(NRA). NPC measures the ratio between the average price received by producers at the 
farm gate (including payments per tonne of current output), and the border price, 
measured at the farm gate. An NPC value greater than one suggests that producers are 
being protected, while an NPC value below one means that agricultural producers are 
being taxed. If producers’ share in border price increases, NPC value increases, 
suggesting that explicit taxation is decreasing. The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) is 
computed (Anderson and Valenzuela 2009) as the percentage by which government 
policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the 
government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). The higher NRA value, the 
larger price distortion is. Average NRA defines the delivered rates of distortion to 
domestic prices for food and export products from policy interventions. Support to 
agricultural sector can also come in the form of investment in agricultural R&D and 
government spending in agriculture, which is proxied by agricultural R&D per 
researcher and share of agriculture in total government spending, respectively. 
The third set of variables focuses on the terms of trade of agricultural sector, 
including real producer price (RPP, calculated at the farmgate price divided by CPI), as 
well as relative price of agricultural products to nonagricultural products and relative 
price of agricultural products to industrial products (expressed as the ratio of agricultural 
GDP deflators to nonagricultural and industry GDP deflators, respectively). These   20 
variables not only inspect the price support to agricultural products, but also take into 
account assistance to producers of non-agricultural tradables.  
The last set of variables measures the trade openness as the ratio of trade to GDP: 
openness of agricultural sector (ratio of agricultural trade to agricultural GDP). We 
calculate the dependence on agricultural imports as ratio of agricultural import to 
agricultural GDP and the importance of international markets for agricultural output as 
ratio of agricultural export to agricultural GDP. Table 4 summarizes the variables, 
sources, coverage and expected impact on TFP. 
In order to measure the effect of policy interventions on agricultural TFP, the 
analytical model of the constrained agricultural TFP growth rate is expressed as a 
function of policies variables including macro policy, support to agriculture, agriculture 
term of trade and agriculture trade. Since many variables are expressed in indexes, we 
construct an unbalanced panel dataset of growth rates starting at 1971. Evidence from 
panel unit root test indicates that growth rate variables are stationary, suggesting that the 
series considered as our panel are stationary and our parameter estimates are valid. 
Although Panel vector autoregression does not report serious endogeneity problem, past 
literature suggest that ignoring endogenous trade variables could produce biased and 
inconsistent estimators (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). At present, instrumentation with 
geography is still the most promising way to solve the endogeneity problem (Irwon and 
Tervio, 2002; Noguer and Siscart 2005). This paper will take this approach to address 
the endogeneity issue. 
Following Frankel and Romer (1999), the empirical regression adopts a two-
stage approach. In the first stage, we derive an instrument of trade openness by 
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� is the share of trade between country i  and country j on 
country i’s GDP, Dij is the distance between the countries, the trading partners size is 
measured in population N and area A, L is a dummy for landlocked countries, and B is a   21 
dummy for a common border between country i and j, SSA is a dummy indicating 
country j is also located in sub-Saharan Africa, ε is the error term.  
Bilateral trade is calculated as the sum of  the value of exports and imports 
between country i and j, and is drawn from the UN Comtrade database. The matrix of 
geographic distance between two countries, being landlocked, land area, sharing a 
common border (contiguity) are extracted from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationals (CEPII) database, as described in Head, Mayer, and Ries 
(2010). The distance is calculated using the great circle formula between two countries. 
GDP and population data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 
database (World Bank, 2010). The bilateral trade data covers 161 countries in 1962-
2005. 
The gravity model results are shown in Table 5, which are generally consistent 
with our expectation and results in the gravity model literature. Distance between two 
countries is negatively associated with bilateral trade. Trade between country i and 
country j decreases in country i’s population and both countries’ area, confirming the 
inverse relationship between countries’ trade share and their sizes.  In addition, trade 
increases in country j’s population. Trade could fall by as much as 35 percent if country i 
is landlocked, and drop even more if country j is also landlocked. Substantially lower 
trade volume is reported if the trading partner (country j) is located in sub-Saharan 
Africa, but this is not necessarily the case if country i is a SSA country. Although the 
presence of contiguity (common border) does not increase trade, the impacts of other 
geographic factors on trade are changed as the interaction terms between border and 
other variables are mostly significant. For instance, distance is no longer a deterrent if 
two countries share a border. Sharing a common border can facilitate flow of 
commodities in landlocked countries. The statistical significance is very high for all 
variables with the exception of some interaction terms, indicating that only a small 
fraction of country pairs in the sample share a common border (Ferrarini, 2010). Similar 
to Frankel and Romer (1999), our panel results verify that geographic variables are one 
of the major contributors of trade with an R-square of 0.36.  
Next, the fitted value from the gravity model of bilateral trade is aggregated 
across trade partners to generate the trade instrument variable (Frankel and Romer,   22 
1999). The constructed trade share in GDP of country i that is attributable to geographic 
factors is expressed as  
Tı � = ∑ exp [ln�
tradeij
GDPi
�] j≠i                                                                                               (9) 
The quality of the instrument is evaluated by examining the resemblance of the 
instrument, estimated trade share T �, with the actual share T. Both Pearson and Spearman 
correlation report high correlation coefficients above 0.5, slightly lower than 0.57 
reported by Ferrarini (2010). The correlation coefficient is 0.68 when applied to 127 
countries in 1985, higher than the correlation of 0.62 found by Frankel and Romer 
(1999) in 150 countries. Similarly, a visual presentation of the relationship between the 
estimated and actual ratio prove that a major portion of the variation in overall trade can 
be explained by the geographic variables (Figure 3). 
Agricultural products are a large part of total trade for many SSA countries. On 
average agricultural commodities account for 31 percent of export revenue and 21 
percent of imports in 2000-2005. This ratio can reach more than 70 percent in some 
West African countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau. Therefore, we also 
introduce two alternative variables as instruments for exports and imports to reflect the 
share of agricultural export and import in GDP. 
In the second stage of analysis, we regress agricultural TFP on the four sets of 
policy variables, namely, macroeconomic policy, support to agriculture, agricultural 
terms of trade and agricultural trade openness. Since many variables within the same set 
are highly correlated and have different country and time coverage, we examine different 
variable combinations for result robustness. Table 6 presents the results of panel and 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions. We expect the coefficient of money supply to be 
positive as higher money supply implies more active economic activities and a more 
productive agricultural sector. Higher inflation increases uncertainty over future relative 
prices, high price volatility, discourages investment and savings, and eventually might 
lead to lower economic growth. The coefficients of agricultural support are expected to 
be positive as support should motivate producers to invest, increase the use of inputs and 
the adoption of new technology. The estimated coefficients from the panel fixed effect 
model are reported in the first column of Table 6. The coefficients of money supply and 
inflation are significant and of the expected sign. Interestingly, we find agricultural   23 
sector support and openness of agricultural trade negatively associated with productivity 
growth.  
In order to better understand the effect of agricultural trade and the negative sign 
of agricultural trade openness in Table 6, we disaggregate trade into agricultural export 
and agricultural import. The last five columns in Table 6 describe the IV estimation 
results using different instruments for agricultural trade openness. IV analysis does not 
yield statistically significant results when using the share of trade, agricultural trade, or 
agricultural export in GDP (columns 2-4 in Table 6). However, estimated coefficients 
based on the share of agricultural import in GDP (columns 5 and 6 in Table 6) are almost 
identical to that of panel fixed effect, which confirms the panel VAR results of no 
significant endogeneity among agricultural trade openness and other policy variables. 
In order to examine the robustness of the trade variable, we replace the trade 
openness variable used in the regressions reported in Table 6 with two separate trade 
variables: the share of export and import in GDP, instrumented with their corresponding 
predicted values produced in the first stage of gravity model regression. This 
disaggregation also allows us to pinpoint the relative importance of export and import in 
promoting agricultural productivity. Table 7 summarizes the results using alternative 
trade indicators. The coefficients of money and inflation under fixed effect models are 
unchanged from the original trade openness model definition. However, only the 
coefficients of agricultural imports remain significant despite different instruments. The 
results echo our finding in Table 6, suggesting that growth in agricultural productivity is 
mainly driven by agricultural imports rather than exports. The negative sign suggests 
that high dependence on agricultural imports is associated with productivity slowdowns. 
That is, import of agricultural commodities has a depressing effect on domestic 
productivity in SSA countries.  
Instead of supporting policies for agricultural sector in general, we also zoom in 
to examine the impact of subsector specific policies on agricultural TFP. Table 8 reports 
three sets of agricultural supporting policies: protection coefficient (NPC) and real 
producer price (RPP) for agriculture, agricultural export crops, and cereals. Again, the 
only significant coefficient is for agricultural imports.    24 
When we apply nominal rate of assistance of cereal and cash crops to a smaller 
sample of nine countries (not reported in Table 9), the beneficial effect of relative price 
is pronounced and consistent across all model definition, while improved terms of trade 
for agricultural commodities life productivity with a considerable elasticity of 0.1.  
Our last group of agricultural support variables includes agricultural R&D and 
government expenditure, which are only applied to a smaller sample due to data 
availability. Table 9 shows that although the coefficients of agricultural R&D are not 
significant under model specification, the coefficients of money supply, inflation, 
sectoral support and trade openness are all significant and greater than in the large 
sample. If the sample is further narrowed down to five major agricultural producers 
(Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan and Kenya), none of the policy variables proves 
relevant to agricultural productivity (right panel of Table 9). Estimation results remain 
unchanged when relative price between agricultural and nonagricultural products is 
replaced with real producer price to include other important countries like Ethiopia. The 
results not only further confirm the relationship between agricultural productivity and 
policies, but also highlight the robustness of the relationship under different definition of 
agricultural terms of trade. 
Public expenditure in agricultural sector indicates the importance of agriculture 
in government policy agenda (Table 10). Parallel to the results above, the small sample 
of eight SSA countries corroborates our findings, showing positive correlation between 
improved terms of trade for agricultural products and enhance TFP performance. Lower 
TFP scores could be driven by high inflation or lower protection of imports. 
 Instead of using money supply and inflation, Table 11 and Table 12 show 
regression results using the real exchange rate and the index of currency undervaluation 
as alternative measures to represent macroeconomic policy, respectively. Trade theory 
predicts that undervalued currency (low real exchange rate in Table 11 and high index of 
currency undervaluation in Table 12) suggest a depreciation of local currency, which 
encourage export and discourage imports. If the real value of local currency decreases 
and the depreciation is passed back to domestic farmers, productivity should increase. 
Our results in Table 11 and Table 12 showcase the relationship. The effects of other 
variables are consistent with previous model using fiscal policies: higher dependence on   25 
import openness appears to dampen productivity and favorable prices for agricultural 
products provide considerable incentives for farmers to improve performance. 
In summary, our two-stage approach shows that geographic factors account for a 
major part of variation in trade performance. Fiscal policies and exchange rates do have 
impact on agricultural TFP growth. We find a positive impact of money supply on 
productivity, and also that inflation had a detrimental effect on agricultural TFP. 
Government’s policy can also boost TFP through the channel of local currency 
depreciation. In addition, the impact of trade is mainly channeled through imports of 
agricultural products, which discourage domestic production. In addition, our results are 
consistent under different model specifications using various agricultural policy 
combinations, proving the robustness of our results. 
   
6. Conclusions 
In this study we analyze the evolution of SSA’s agricultural TFP between 1961 
and 2006 looking for evidence of recent changes in growth patterns using an improved 
nonparametric Malmquist index and its components, efficiency and technical change 
indices, for 37 SSA countries. Unlike previous studies using this methodology, we 
constrain the linear programming problem used to estimate distance functions for the 
Malmquist index to rule out the possibility of zero input shadow prices. We also look at 
the contribution of different countries to total TFP growth in SSA and analyze changes 
in the composition of outputs and inputs. Finally, we estimate an econometric model 
relating TFP growth to policy interventions in agriculture and trade.  
Results of our TFP estimates show a remarkable recovery in the performance of 
SSA’s agriculture starting in the mid-1980s and early 1990s after a long period of poor 
performance and decline, which is mostly attributable to the catching up of technological 
frontier. Results of our econometric analysis point to policy changes in SSA countries as 
one of the major factors determining the agricultural sector’s improved performance.  
The favorable impact of policy changes show that policies applied by many SSA 
countries after independence imposed a heavy burden on agriculture, and that the 
structural adjustment implemented in the region brought a more favorable fiscal and 
sectoral policy environment for agriculture. This more favorable policy environment   26 
resulted in improved allocation efficiency and increased production, a more efficient use 
of inputs, and as a consequence of those, increased productivity. We also obtain a non- 
significant impact of agricultural R&D investment on TFP, which is likely reflecting the 
lack of technical progress experienced by SSA’s agriculture in recent years and the 
strong relationship between TFP performance and policy during the analyzed period. 
  Output growth and changes in the relative use of inputs resulted in a significant 
increase in output per hectare, after several years of little or no growth. Considering TFP 
growth together with balanced growth in land and labor productivity as indicators of 
good agriculture performance, we find nine countries (Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Guinea, Cameroon, Mali, Zambia and Ethiopia) with relatively high TFP 
growth and sustained growth in labor and land productivity from 1995 to 2006.  
Despite improved agricultural performance between 1985 and 2006, several 
warning signs still exist, calling for more efforts to sustain TFP growth in the coming 
years. First, the decomposition of TFP growth into efficiency and technical change 
shows that most TFP growth in the last 20 years is the result of SSA catching up to the 
frontier after falling behind between 1970 and 1984.. Without increases in the rate of 
growth of technical change, TFP growth is expected to slow down in the coming years 
as countries catch up with efficiency levels at the production frontier. According to our 
estimates, a slowdown in TFP growth is already apparent in the cases of Nigeria and 
Ghana, the leaders of the recovery of SSA’s agriculture in the mid-1980s. Second, 
substantial distortions remain that still impose a large tax burden on Africa’s poor, and 
are much larger than those in other developing regions as shown by Anderson and 
Masters (2008). Third, sustained growth in labor productivity faces the challenge of 
population growth and related increases in agricultural labor per hectare. In many 
countries, expansion of labor productivity was possible because those countries were 
still able to incorporate more land into crop production. If the availability of land reduces 
in the coming years, yields will need to increase faster to compensate for growth in rural 
population and improve rural income.   27 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative agricultural TFP growth and decomposition in efficiency and 
technical change for SSA, simple geometric mean (index =1 in 1961) 
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Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Figure 3. Estimated versus actual trade share 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Table 1. TFP growth rate and decomposition for different periods (percentage) 
 
   TFP  Efficiency  Technical change 
1961-2006  0.02  -0.24  0.32 
1961-1983  -1.33  -1.32  0.20 
1984-2006  1.37  0.90  0.45 
1984-1995  1.25  1.28  0.25 
1996-2006  1.43  0.77  0.65 
Source: Authors estimation. 
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Table 2. Ranking of countries by TFP growth performance, 1984-2006 and 1995-2006 
(Index=1 means zero growth, and TFP=Efficiency*Technical change) 
 
   1984-2006     1995-2006 
    TFP  Efficiency  
 Tech. 
change      TFP  Efficiency  
 Tech. 
change 
Angola  1.040  1.040  1.000  Angola  1.063  1.063  1.000 
Nigeria  1.034  1.034  1.000  Mozambique  1.043  1.043  1.000 
Ghana  1.030  1.028  1.002  Tanzania  1.037  1.037  1.000 
Tanzania  1.024  1.024  1.000 
Burkina 
Faso  1.034  1.026  1.007 
Sierra Leone  1.024  1.017  1.006  Sierra Leone  1.030  1.017  1.012 
Togo  1.019  1.014  1.005  Nigeria  1.025  1.025  1.000 
Kenya  1.018  1.013  1.005  Ghana  1.021  1.016  1.004 
Sudan  1.017  1.017  1.000  Mali  1.021  1.019  1.002 
Cameroon  1.016  1.011  1.005  Zambia  1.020  1.019  1.001 
Chad  1.016  1.014  1.002  Madagascar  1.018  1.018  1.000 
Mali  1.016  1.015  1.001  Ethiopia  1.016  1.015  1.001 
Benin  1.016  1.000  1.016  Cameroon  1.014  1.005  1.009 
Mozambique  1.014  1.014  1.000  Guinea  1.014  1.014  1.000 
Burkina 
Faso  1.013  1.010  1.004  Zimbabwe  1.011  0.987  1.024 
Zambia  1.013  1.013  1.000  Togo  1.010  1.004  1.006 
Gabon  1.013  1.013  1.000  Kenya  1.010  1.001  1.009 
Malawi  1.013  1.009  1.003  Ivory Coast  1.009  1.002  1.007 
Ethiopia  1.010  1.010  1.001  Gabon  1.009  1.009  1.000 
Ivory Coast  1.009  1.006  1.004  Malawi  1.008  1.001  1.007 
Madagascar  1.004  1.004  1.000  Sudan  1.007  1.007  1.000 
Guinea-
Bissau  1.004  1.003  1.001 
Guinea-
Bissau  1.002  1.001  1.001 
Zimbabwe  1.000  0.985  1.015  Benin  1.001  0.986  1.015 
Senegal  1.000  0.996  1.004  Gambia  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Guinea  0.999  0.999  1.000  Swaziland  0.999  0.942  1.061 
Swaziland  0.993  0.957  1.037  Chad  0.998  0.994  1.004 
Gambia  0.989  0.989  1.000  Senegal  0.977  0.970  1.006 
Source: Authors’ estimation.   
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Table 3. Annual changes in labor/land ratios, labor and land productivity, and TFP 
(percentage) in best performing countries, 1995–2006 
 




productivity  TFP 
Angola  1.82  4.50  2.63  6.35 
Nigeria  -0.65  1.47  2.14  2.47 
Ghana  -0.61  1.46  2.09  2.06 
Mozambique  0.11  1.94  1.83  4.32 
Guinea  -0.97  0.71  1.69  1.43 
Cameroon  0.50  2.02  1.51  1.43 
Mali  0.38  1.70  1.32  2.05 
Zambia  0.58  1.76  1.17  1.98 
Ethiopia  -0.73  0.42  1.16  1.64 
Source: Authors estimation.     37 
Table 4. Summary of policy variables 
Variable  Source  Year  Country  Expect 
sign 
Dependent variables         
TFP  Authors’ calculation  1962-2005  39   
         
Set 1 -  macro policies         
Money supply  WDI (2010)  1970-2005  37  + 
Inflation  WDI (2010)  1970-2005  37  - 
Real exchange rate  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  - 
Undervalue of currency  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  + 
         
Set 2 -  support to agricultural sector   
NPC  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  + 
NRA  Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)  1962-2005  12  - 
Agri. R&D  ASTI (IFPRI, 2011)  1981-2005  26  + 
Agri. expenditure share  SPEED  (IFPRI, 2010)  1980-2007  12  + 
         
Set 3 -  agricultural term of trade   
RPP  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  + 
Relative price agri./nonag.  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  28  + 
Relative price agri./industry  Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  28  + 
         
Set 4 -  openness of agricultural trade   
Trade openness 
(export+import)/GDP 
Authors’ calculation  1962-2005  37  + 
Ag trade openness 
(ag export+ag import) 
/agGDP 
Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  + 
Dependence of ag import 
ag import/agGDP 
Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  - 
Importance of ag export  
ag export/agGDP 
Authors’ calculation  1970-2005  37  + 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WDI (2010).     38 
Table 5. Gravity model estimation 
   ln(openness)     ln(export share)     ln(import share) 
Variable  coef.  std. error     coef.  std. error     coef.  std. error 
lnd  -1.01  0.006***    -0.90  0.006***    -0.89  0.006*** 
lnn_i  -0.02  0.004***    -0.07  0.004***    -0.10  0.004*** 
lna_i  -0.19  0.003***    -0.15  0.003***    -0.17  0.003*** 
lnn_j  0.79  0.003***    0.77  0.004***    0.79  0.004*** 
lna_j  -0.16  0.003***    -0.16  0.003***    -0.13  0.003*** 
landlock_i  -0.35  0.014***    -0.23  0.015***    -0.36  0.015*** 
landlock_j  -1.09  0.014***    -1.08  0.015***    -0.85  0.016*** 
ssa_i  0.36  0.011***    0.09  0.012***    0.33  0.011*** 
ssa_j  -1.62  0.011***    -1.48  0.012***    -1.65  0.013*** 
border  -0.68  0.305**    1.06  0.313***    1.04  0.321*** 
borderXlnd  0.55  0.041***    0.39  0.042***    0.37  0.043*** 
borderXlnn_i  -0.23  0.027***    0.00  0.027    -0.28  0.028*** 
borderXlna_i  -0.03  0.025    -0.12  0.026***    -0.02  0.026 
borderXlnn_j  -0.09  0.027***    -0.19  0.027***    0.09  0.028*** 
borderXlna_j  -0.10  0.025***    -0.07  0.025***    -0.17  0.026*** 
borderXlandlock_i  0.88  0.074***    0.58  0.071***    1.03  0.073*** 
borderXlandlock_j  0.80  0.073***    0.98  0.071***    0.44  0.073*** 
borderXssa_i  -0.19  0.129    0.05  0.119    -0.59  0.122*** 
borderXssa_j  0.36  0.129***    0.10  0.119    0.64  0.123*** 
Constant  3.22  0.061***    1.25  0.066***    1.19  0.068*** 
     
 
   
 
    Observations  313,154 
 
  287,075 
 
  287,731 
  R-squared  0.359        0.314        0.310    
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Table 6. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using agricultural trade 













money supply  0.01  -0.13  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 
(0.005)***  (0.707)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
inflation  -0.01  0.15  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
 
(0.005)***  (0.782)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
NPC for agriculture  -0.01  0.14  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
 
(0.004)***  (0.724)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
relative price agri./nonag  0.01  0.40  0.02  0.03  -0.00  -0.00 
 
(0.024)  (1.928)  (0.026)  (0.041)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
ag openness  -0.04  0.70  -0.01  0.01  -0.05  -0.05 
 
(0.010)***  (3.623)  (0.024)  (0.063)  (0.022)**  (0.022)** 
              observations  895  851  829  829  829  829 
number of countries  28  28  27  27  27  27 
weak identification     0.0488  184.9  22.36  220.5  110.9 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   40 
Table 7. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using agricultural export and import 
 




share  ag export 







money supply  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
 
(0.006)**  (0.008)  (0.005)*  (0.005)  (0.006)*  (0.008) 
inflation  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00 
 
(0.006)**  (0.008)  (0.004)*  (0.004)  (0.006)*  (0.008) 
NPC for agriculture  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00 
 
(0.005)*  (0.008)  (0.004)*  (0.004)  (0.005)*  (0.008) 
relative price ag/nonag  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 
(0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
ag exports/agGDP  -0.02  0.00 
   
-0.01  0.01 
 
(0.009)*  (0.020) 
   
(0.010)  (0.019) 
ag imports/agGDP 
   
-0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
     
(0.005)***  (0.007)**  (0.005)***  (0.007)** 
              observations  895  829  895  829  895  829 
number of countries  28  27  28  27  28  27 
weak identification     223.5     552.6     104.8 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using support to subsectors 
   agriculture     export crops     cereal 
 
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV 
money supply  0.01  -0.00 
 
0.01  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00 
 
(0.006)*  (0.008) 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
inflation  -0.01  0.00 
 
-0.00  -0.00 
 
-0.00  -0.00 
 
(0.006)  (0.009) 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
NPC for 
agriculture  -0.01  0.00 
           
 
(0.005)  (0.008) 
            RPP for 
agriculture  -0.01  -0.02 
           
 
(0.014)  (0.014) 
            NPC for export 
crops 
     
-0.00  -0.00 
     
       
(0.004)  (0.004) 
      RPP for export 
crops 
     
0.00  -0.00 
     
       
(0.009)  (0.009) 
      NPC for cereal 
           
-0.00  -0.00 
             
(0.004)  (0.004) 
RPP for cereal 
           
-0.00  -0.00 
             
(0.009)  (0.009) 
ag exports 
/agGDP  -0.00  0.01 
 
0.01  0.01 
 
0.01  0.01 
 
(0.009)  (0.019) 
 
(0.007)  (0.012) 
 
(0.007)  (0.012) 
ag imports 
/agGDP  -0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.03  -0.02 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)** 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)** 
                  observations  1107  995 
 
1115  1003 
 
1114  1002 
no. of countries  37  36 
 
37  36 
 
37  36 
weak 
identification     107.0        163.5        157.6 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Note: Agricultural export and import shares are used as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   42 
Table 9. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using agricultural R&D 
 
    IV    IV 
 




share  ag import 








ag export  ag import 
ag export & 
import 
money supply  0.06  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.02    0.03  0.03  0.03 
  (0.038)  (0.068)  (0.037)*  (0.038)*  (0.037)*  (0.080)    (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.063) 
inflation  -0.07  -0.02  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.00    -0.04  -0.03  -0.04 
  (0.046)  (0.101)  (0.046)  (0.047)*  (0.046)*  (0.119)    (0.062)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
NPC for agriculture  -0.09  0.22  -0.03  -0.03  -0.09  0.36    -0.04  -0.03  -0.04 
  (0.026)***  (0.404)  (0.011)***  (0.012)**  (0.026)***  (0.507)    (0.086)  (0.024)  (0.084) 
ag R&D stock  0.01  -0.04  0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.05    -0.08  -0.08  -0.08 
  (0.058)  (0.086)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.101)    (0.149)  (0.149)  (0.144) 
relative price ag/nonag  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  -0.01    0.03  0.03  0.03 
  (0.046)  (0.060)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.070)    (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.062) 
ag exports/agGDP  -0.10  0.25      -0.07  0.43    -0.01    -0.02 
  (0.027)***  (0.453)      (0.028)**  (0.575)    (0.080)    (0.081) 
ag imports/agGDP      -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04      0.00  0.01 
      (0.011)***  (0.016)***  (0.012)***  (0.025)*      (0.027)  (0.027) 
             
       
observations  355  326  355  326  355  326    101  101  101 
number of countries  18  16  18  16  18  16    5  5  5 
weak identification     1.633     287.6     0.695         
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  43 
Table 10. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using share of agricultural expenditure 
 









share  ag import 







money supply  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02 
 
(0.023)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
inflation  -0.06  -0.01  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.01 
 
(0.031)*  (0.054)  (0.030)*  (0.029)*  (0.031)  (0.050) 
NPC for agriculture  -0.02  0.06  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  0.04 
 
(0.019)  (0.074)  (0.011)***  (0.011)**  (0.018)  (0.068) 
ag expenditure  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
relative price 
ag/nonag  0.14  0.19  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.14 
 
(0.048)***  (0.076)**  (0.048)**  (0.048)**  (0.048)**  (0.070)** 
ag exports/agGDP  0.00  0.12 
   
0.02  0.10 
 
(0.022)  (0.111) 
   
(0.022)  (0.102) 
ag imports/agGDP 
   
-0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
     
(0.006)***  (0.007)**  (0.006)***  (0.007)** 
              observations  198  158  198  158  198  158 
number of countries  8  8  8  8  8  8 
weak identification     7.117     298.3     3.716 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   44 
Table 11. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using real exchange rate 
 
   ag openness     RPP     NPC     ag R&D     ag expenditure 
  
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV 
                                            
exchange rate  -0.01  0.01 
 
-0.01  0.03 
 
0.03  0.02 
 
0.06  0.10 
 
-0.07  -0.06 
 
(0.010)  (0.026) 
 
(0.011)  (0.038) 
 
(0.019)  (0.029) 
 
(0.022)***  (0.092) 
 
(0.030)**  (0.038) 
NPC for 
agriculture  -0.01  0.01 
 
-0.01  0.03 
       
-0.09  -0.26 
 
-0.08  -0.05 
 
(0.009)  (0.023) 
 
(0.009)  (0.033) 
       
(0.023)***  (0.315) 
 
(0.031)**  (0.066) 
relative price 
ag/nonag  -0.00  -0.00 
       
0.04  0.03 
 
0.05  0.10 
 
0.11  0.10 
 
(0.022)  (0.023) 
       
(0.062)  (0.070) 
 
(0.042)  (0.139) 
 
(0.050)**  (0.054)* 
ag exports/agGDP  -0.00  0.02 
 
-0.00  0.04 
 
-0.05  -0.04 
 
-0.09  -0.30 
 
0.01  0.04 
 
(0.010)  (0.037) 
 
(0.010)  (0.044) 
 
(0.028)*  (0.059) 
 
(0.027)***  (0.396) 
 
(0.021)  (0.085) 
ag imports/agGDP  -0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.01  -0.02 
 
-0.04  -0.02 
 
-0.02  -0.02 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
 
(0.009)*  (0.010)** 
 
(0.012)***  (0.034) 
 
(0.006)***  (0.008)*** 
RPP_ag 
     
-0.01  -0.03 
                 
       
(0.013)  (0.021) 
                  NRA for cereal 
           
0.00  -0.00 
           
             
(0.003)  (0.005) 
            NRA for cash 
crops 
           
0.00  0.00 
           
             
(0.008)  (0.008) 
            ag R&D stock 
                 
0.01  0.02 
     
                   
(0.057)  (0.075) 
      ag expenditure 
                       
0.01  0.01 
                         
(0.013)  (0.014) 
                              observations  944  862 
 
1193  1051 
 
167  146 
 
357  328 
 
200  160 
number of 
countries  28  27 
 
37  36 
 
6  5 
 
18  16 
 
8  8 
weak 
identification     30.54        21.89        18.90        0.803        4.527 
Source: Authors’ estimation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   45 
Table 12. Determinants of agricultural TFP, using currency evaluation 
 
 
ag openness     RPP     NPC     ag R&D     ag expenditure 
  
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV    
fixed 
effect  IV 
                              currency valuation  0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00 
 
0.00  0.00 
 
-0.00  -0.00 
 
(0.000)***  (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000)**  (0.000) 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
NPC for 
agriculture  -0.00  0.00 
 
-0.00  -0.00 
       
-0.09  -0.41 
 
-0.02  0.00 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.001)*  (0.001) 
       
(0.024)***  (0.500) 
 
(0.014)  (0.025) 
relative price 
ag/nonag  -0.01  0.00 
       
0.06  0.04 
 
0.05  0.18 
 
0.05  0.05 
 
(0.021)  (0.023) 
       
(0.061)  (0.065) 
 
(0.043)  (0.233) 
 
(0.043)  (0.046) 
ag exports/agGDP  -0.00  0.01 
 
0.00  0.01 
 
-0.05  -0.04 
 
-0.09  -0.48 
 
0.02  0.07 
 
(0.008)  (0.014) 
 
(0.007)  (0.013) 
 
(0.028)*  (0.059) 
 
(0.027)***  (0.622) 
 
(0.023)  (0.066) 
ag imports/agGDP  -0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.03  -0.02 
 
-0.01  -0.02 
 
-0.04  0.00 
 
-0.02  -0.03 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
 
(0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
 
(0.009)*  (0.010)** 
 
(0.012)***  (0.054) 
 
(0.006)***  (0.007)*** 
RPP_ag 
     
-0.02  -0.01 
                 
       
(0.010)*  (0.011) 
                  NRA for cereal 
           
0.00  -0.00 
           
             
(0.003)  (0.005) 
            NRA for cash 
crops 
           
0.00  0.00 
           
             
(0.008)  (0.008) 
            ag R&D stock 
                 
0.01  0.05 
     
                   
(0.057)  (0.109) 
      ag expenditure 
                       
0.01  0.01 
                         
(0.013)  (0.014) 
                              observations  944  862 
 
1193  1051 
 
167  146 
 
357  328 
 
200  160 
number of 
countries  28  27 
 
37  36 
 
6  5 
 
18  16 
 
8  8 
weak 
identification     149.4        173.1        17.90        0.473        10.32 
Source: Authors’ estimation. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 